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The Right to Health Care in the United States*
Kenneth R. Wing**
There are three basic points I would like to make in this paper.
The first is the most straightforward: There is nothing that can be
characterized-at least in any general sense-as a constitutional
right to health care in the United States. The federal Constitution
does not require any level of government to provide for or maintain
the health of the population as a whole or any portion of it; there
are a few circumstances under which an individual can make a
constitutionally-based claim for a health or medical benefit, but
these circumstances are rare and the use of the term "right to
health care" in reference to them would be both misleading and
inappropriate.
The second point is related to the first, somewhat more abstract,
but equally important: Given the nature of constitutional rights in
this country and the manner in which they are enforced, it is hard
to imagine that there could be any general or broadly applicable
constitutional right to health care. Even a court that would be
inclined to do so would be faced with both theoretical and practical
difficulties of insurmountable proportions in devising and enforcing
such a governmental obligation.
My third point will sound in some ways contradictory to the first
two, but is, ultimately, the most important: There are significant
rights to health care in the United States, although they are more
properly characterized as political rights or entitlements than con-
stitutional rights. And it is the nature and extent of these rights
which are of prime significance when comparing the United States
to other jurisdictions or otherwise evaluating contemporary health
policy.
* This paper was presented at the Third Annual Comparative Health Law
Conference sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for Health
Law in October of 1992.
** Kenneth R. Wing is a Professor at the School of Law, University of Puget Sound,
and the School of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Washington.
He received his Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School in 1971 and his Masters of Public
Health from the Harvard School of Public Health in 1972.
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SECTION I
To begin with the most fundamental, the United States Constitu-
tion does not require the federal government, the state govern-
ments, or any other level of government to protect the health of its
citizens collectively or individually.1 This has less to do with the
fact that the Constitution neither explicitly nor implicitly recog-
nizes the value of health or health care, there is no textual refer-
ence to either term, and more to do with the overall structure of
the Constitution. The constitutional provisions that protect indi-
vidual interests, and that are generally referred to as constitutional
rights, are almost exclusively negative. They prevent, rather than
require, government action of one sort or another. The interstate
commerce, spending, and other constitutional provisions that em-
power the federal government to act have been interpreted broadly
and to include the power to create federal health programs of vir-
tually any kind, but this authority is permissive not mandatory.2
Similarly, the definition of the states' inherent "police powers," as
implied by the enumeration of the federal government's powers
and as preserved by the language of the Tenth Amendment, clearly
includes broadly defined powers to act in matters relating to
health, but, again, the states' authority is defined permissively and
does not obligate the states to act to protect their citizens in any
affirmative sense. 3 In fact, the Constitution does not require gov-
1. It should be emphasized at the outset that the analysis in this paper is focused
exclusively on the requirements of the United States Constitution. It is possible-
although rarely explored in either the case law or in legal commentary-that the consti-
tution of an individual state could be interpreted differently and in such a way as to
recognize that either the state itself or a state's local government has an affirmative obli-
gation to provide for the health or welfare of its citizens. For example, in Deaconess
Medical Center v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 720 P.2d 1165 (Mont.
1986), the Montana Supreme Court implied that the state had some minimal obligation
to provide for the health needs of its citizens under a state constitutional provision which
reads: "The legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilita-
tive services as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity, or
misfortune may have need for the aid of society." MONT. CONST., art. XII, § 3(3).
Affirmative obligations have also have been imposed on county or local governments in
some states by legislation (although not by constitutional mandate). See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-251 (1992) (as interpreted by Hernandez v. County of Yuma, 369
P.2d 271 (Ariz. 1962)); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1992).
2. For a discussion of the enumerated powers of the federal government in matters
relating to health and health care, see KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S
HEALTH 17-18 (3d ed. 1990).
3. The federal Constitution does not explicitly define the state's powers; rather, it is
structured in such a way as to define those powers ceded by the states to the federal
government. All other governmental authority, subject to other constitutional restric-
tions, is assumed to belong to the individual states. As such, the Tenth Amendment is
generally regarded as confirming the states' powers, rather than an independent or pri-
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ernment to provide any domestic or social welfare benefit. Gov-
erning, at least in these areas if not in all matters, is essentially
discretionary under the American constitutional structure.4 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently reaffirmed this "no
affirmative right" principle as a fundamental and general precept
of modern constitutional doctrine.5
The few relevant exceptions to this principle only highlight its
breadth and implications. The Supreme Court has recognized that
government has some affirmative responsibility to provide for the
needs, including the medical needs, of mental patients, the institu-
tionalized retarded, prisoners, and, presumably, other wards of the
state or federal governments.6 But in each of the cases in which it
has done so, the Court has premised its reasoning on the fact that
the protected individual was in the custody, in the most literal
sense, of the government and has insisted that any mandatory gov-
ernment responsibility be strictly limited to those circumstances.7
And even with regard to the individual who is in custody, the gov-
ernment's obligation to provide care has been so narrowly defined
by the Court as to represent little more than a "freedom from
abuse," and nothing that could be realistically regarded as a gener-
alized right to health care or treatment, or as a right to treatment
or services of any particular kind.8
mary source of state authority. For a more detailed explanation of the states' powers in
matters relating to health, see id. at 18-19, 25-35.
4. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)
(state social service programs had no constitutional obligation to prevent child abuse even
where it had evidence that the father was physically abusing the child). See also Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (quoting DeShaney as applicable in defining the
obligation of the federal government).
5. Virtually the only circumstances in which the Supreme Court has required the
government to act are those where the government has already undertaken to provide
some benefits and constitutional principles require others to be provided as well. See
infra notes 13-21, 82-85. Otherwise, the government is not even required to provide basic
policing or public health services.
6. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court recognized
that involuntarily confined mental patients have a "right to liberty"-although the Court
explicitly declined to rule that that right might require the treatment of those who are
involuntarily confined. In a complicated line of cases in the 1980s, the Court also recog-
nized what could be loosely termed a constitutional right to "treatment" or "habilita-
tion" for the mentally retarded. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Court also has
recognized that incarcerated prisoners have what could be characterized as a limited
right to medical treatment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter,
111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991); Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). Cf infra note 8.
7. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-201.
8. See discussion in WING, supra note 2, at 58-72. The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the "right" to medical treatment of incarcerated prisoners is demonstrative. On
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If the term right to health care has any relevance in describing
constitutional doctrine in the United States, it is in reference to
those constraints imposed on the government's discretion once it
has exercised its broadly defined powers to provide or finance
health or health-related benefits. In authorizing or implementing
such programs as Medicaid, Medicare, or any of the other federal,
state, or local health care financing or service activities,9 the gov-
ernment must comply with important constitutionally-imposed
constraints, particularly the nondiscrimination requirements of
equal protection and the "fairness" requirements of due process as
imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 0 While still
essentially negative in nature, these constitutional constraints
could be characterized as creating rights to health care in that they
allow, in essence, the argument that so long as some benefits are
provided to some people they must be provided to others as well.
The extent and nature of the rights to health care created by
these constitutional constraints has been rather definitively illus-
trated by a series of abortion funding cases decided in the last two
decades. In the companion cases of Maher v. Roe" and Beal v.
Doe, 12 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a Medicaid
program which allowed state funding for childbirth and therapeu-
several occasions the Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment to mean that the state cannot be deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of prisoners; however, the Court has specifically held that ordinary "mal-
practice" is not cruel or unusual. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986). In Wilson v. Seiter, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, summarized these
cases:
Since we said, only the " 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" impli-
cates the Eighth Amendment .... a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a
minimum, allege "deliberate indifference" to his "serious" medical needs. "It is
only such indifference" that can violate the Eighth Amendment ....
[A]llegations of "inadvertent failure to provide medical care".., or of a "negli-
gent ... diagnos[is]" . . . simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of
mind.
111 S. Ct. at 2323 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
9. See description of these programs infra notes 87-90.
10. While most arguments are premised on the requirements of equal protection and
substantive due process, it can also be argued-although rarely with much success-that
other constitutional constraints impose similar obligations on the government. See
Eighth Amendment cases, supra note 8; O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S.
773 (1980) (procedural due process does not require continuation of benefits to patients in
decertified nursing home); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (limits on government
funding of abortions do not violate the right to privacy or the establishment clause of the
First Amendment; First Amendment free exercise claim not properly raised); Rust, 111
S. Ct. 1759 (First Amendment free speech not violated by limits on abortion counseling).
11. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
12. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
HeinOnline  -- 2 Annals Health L. 164 1993
Right to Health Care
tic abortions, but denied reimbursement for nontherapeutic abor-
tions, was a violation of equal protection. The Court held that the
state's limitation on funding need only satisfy the requirements of
"rationality," and that the state's interest in promoting childbirth
was a sufficiently "rational" basis for refusing to fund some serv-
ices while choosing to fund related services.' 3 The Court followed
similar reasoning in Harris v. McRae, 14 in upholding a congres-
sional ban on all federally funded abortions except those involving
rape or incest or those where the life of the mother was at stake.
Even where the health (but not the life) of a woman may be in
jeopardy, the government's decision to refuse to finance her medi-
cal care need only be rational to satisfy the requirements of equal
protection and due process, and a legislative preference for child-
birth over maternal health is sufficient to satisfy that constitutional
standard. '5
Virtually the same reasoning was applied to a state government
decision to prohibit public institutions and public employees from
performing abortions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 6
and to a federal prohibition on the counseling or discussion of
abortions imposed on family clinics that receive federal funds in
Rust v. Sullivan. 7 In both cases, the Court held that the govern-
ment's decision to exclude abortion or related activities while con-
tinuing to finance or provide other services relating to childbirth or
pregnancy need only be rational to meet constitutional require-
ments. And, again, it reaffirmed that the government's interest in
discouraging or preventing abortions is by itself a sufficiently ra-
tional explanation for the limitations imposed on these governmen-
tal programs.'
The broader implications of these cases for defining the rights
that may be claimed by those who are denied the benefits of gov-
ernment health programs may be obscured by the specific focus of
each of these cases on the issue of abortion, as well as by the some-
what stilted rhetoric that characterizes constitutional analysis in
this area of the law. Nonetheless, these decisions and their under-
13. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478.
14. 448 U.S. 297.
15. 448 U.S. at 326. Note that Harris also considered and rejected arguments based
on the First Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution, in addition to equal
protection and due process claims. Id. at 312-21.
16. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
17. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
18. For a more detailed analysis of these cases, see Kenneth R. Wing, Speech, Pri-
vacy, & the Power of the Purse: Lessons from the Abortion "Gag Rule" Case, 17 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 163 (1992).
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Annals Health L. 165 1993
Annals of Health Law
lying reasoning deserve considerable attention because they define
the outer limits and, as it turns out, decidedly narrow scope, of the
rights to health care created by such constitutional requirements as
those of equal protection and due process when applied to govern-
ment discretionary decisions in health care and related programs.
At the time that each of these decisions was rendered, the
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade'9 was still "good law."' 20 That is
to say, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of each of these
abortion limitations as if a woman's choice concerning abortion
was a constitutionally-protected "fundamental interest." In the
rhetoric used by modern courts in equal protection or due process
analysis, if a government decision adversely "affects" a "funda-
mental interest" or, alternatively, discriminates on the basis of a
racial or other "suspect" classification, then a reviewing court is
required to impose a rigorous "close scrutiny" analysis to that gov-
ernmental determination.2' Under "close scrutiny," the court
must find that the government's interest is sufficiently "compel-
ling" to justify the impact on the "affected" "fundamental interest"
and that the legislation is "narrowly tailored" so as to minimize
that impact. Legislative determinations subject to "strict scrutiny"
can survive judicial review, but rarely do so. In functional terms, a
judicial determination to extend the protections of "close scrutiny"
to an individual interest or activity is a determination of that inter-
est or activity's status as a "constitutional right."'22
Conversely, if "close scrutiny" is not applied, as is generally the
case with government decisions that do not affect First Amend-
ment interests, citizenship, constitutionally-protected aspects of
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. In Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) the Supreme
Court reformulated previous doctrine concerning the government's power to regulate
abortions. In doing so, the Court somewhat diluted the constitutional status of abortion
privacy, allowing the government to regulate abortions so long as there is no "undue
burden" on the woman's privacy interest-as opposed to requiring, as had previous case
law, a demanding "close scrutiny." As a consequence, the discretion of the government
to finance or provide abortion services must be even more broadly defined than it was in
those cases that assumed the Roe v. Wade definition of abortion privacy.
21. For a discussion of "suspect classifications," see infra text accompanying notes
48-52.
22. Whether an activity or interest is considered a "fundamental interest" for pur-
poses of equal protection or due process analysis, or considered a constitutional right per
se, e.g., the interests protected by the First Amendment, there is no absolute prohibition
on government action with respect to that activity or that interest. Such constitutional
recognition only secures for that activity or interest the protection of judicial "close scru-
tiny" or some equivalently enhanced level of judicial review of the underlying justification
for its denial or abridgement.
[Vol. 2
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privacy, or other recognized "fundamental interests, '2 3 then the
reviewing court need only find that the legislation or executive ac-
tion is rational. Under a standard of rationality, a court is required
to make only a cursory review of the government's purpose and its
relation to the means chosen to achieve that purpose, and to en-
gage in a minimal and decidedly deferential evaluation of the ac-
tual impact of the decision on affected individuals.
Prior to the abortion funding cases, the Supreme Court had in
previous cases held that most government decisions to provide or
fund social welfare benefits--cash payments, other social services,
even public education--do not involve a "fundamental interest"
and therefore are generally subject to no more than a rationality
review. 24 Under the view adopted by the Court, an interest or ac-
tivity must be both fundamental in the sense that it is very impor-
tant and "fundamental" in the sense that it is somehow recognized
as such by the Constitution to be regarded as "fundamental" for
purposes of "close scrutiny" analysis.2" In fact, the Court has care-
fully and purposefully adopted this rigid definition of "fundamen-
tal interests" in order to limit those circumstances under which
heightened judicial scrutiny is required.26 Similarly, the Court has
carefully limited the circumstances under which judicial "close
scrutiny" is triggered by the finding that the governmental classifi-
cation is "suspect. '27
The critical significance of the abortion funding decisions in clar-
ifying these principles was threefold: First, these cases confirmed
what had already been strongly implied by previous decisions: An
individual's interest in health or health-related benefits, even where
the health status of the individual is in serious jeopardy, is not
within the limited class of interests that are "fundamental" in the
constitutional sense of the term and, therefore, is not deserving of
enhanced judicial protection. Health or health benefits may be
fundamental, meaning that they are very important, but they are
not, as noted earlier, recognized or protected, even by implication,
23. See discussion infra notes 28-31, 77-81.
24. See discussion infra notes 39-44, 71-73.
25. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-38 (1973).
See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). For a broader discussion, see WING,
supra note 2, at 117-21.
26. See WING, supra note 2, at 128-33. Note, however, that at least some state courts
have adopted a different judicial posture and a somewhat broader reading of the antidis-
crimination requirements of their state constitutions. See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d
139 (Or. 1976).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 72-76.
1993]
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in the federal Constitution.28
Second, these cases raised-and rejected-the possibility that at
least some limits or exclusions from government health or health-
related programs are subject to more rigorous judicial review, even
if most are not, where such interests as privacy, speech, or perhaps
other "fundamental interests" are "affected" by a limit or exclu-
sion. In Maher, Beal, and again in Harris, the Court insisted that a
government decision to finance some medical services related to
pregnancy but not abortions does not "affect"-in the constitu-
tional sense of the term-an individual seeking an abortion, even if
abortion is an aspect of privacy deserving enhanced constitutional
protection when "affected" in other ways. 29 According to the
Court's analysis in these cases, unlike a government decision that
makes an abortion a crime or otherwise affirmatively prevents an
abortion, a decision by the government to deny abortion funding
leaves the individual "no worse off" than if the government had
not acted at all; as a consequence, no "fundamental interest" is
"affected" by that decision.30
The decision in Webster took the same premise a step further.
The government does not "affect" the privacy of a woman seeking
an abortion when it denies her access to public facilities or to the
services of public employees.31 According to Webster, the woman
is still "no worse off" than she would be if the government had
provided no facilities or employees at all. 32 The underlying analy-
sis in Rust was somewhat more complicated but essentially the
same. At least in the eyes of the majority of the Supreme Court, a
woman seeking family planning counseling is "no worse off" re-
ceiving counseling for some matters but not for others that the gov-
ernment chooses to prevent or discourage; consequently, her
"fundamental interest" in abortion is not constitutionally "af-
fected" when she receives family planning advice and counseling
within the strict limits imposed by the "gag rules. ' 33 Similarly, the
Court found that the First Amendment interests of the counselors
who under those federal regulations are prohibited, in the most lit-
28. Indeed, in light of the Court's earlier decisions discussed supra note 25, the argu-
ment that health or health care is a "fundamental interest" was not even raised in these
cases. Cf Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974).
29. Harris, 448 U.S. 297, 314-17, 322-23; Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 473-78.
30. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 196
(1989).
31. 492 U.S. 490, 507-11.
32. Id. at 509.
33. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
[Vol. 2
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eral sense of the term, from any use of the word "abortion" are not
"affected" by this prohibition:
Individuals who are voluntarily employed for a Title X project
must perform their duties in accordance with the regulation's re-
strictions on abortion counseling and referral. The employees re-
main free, however, to pursue abortion-related activities when
they are not acting under the auspices of the Title X project. The
regulations ... do not in any way restrict the activities of those
persons acting as private individuals. The employees' freedom of
expression is limited during the time that they actually work for
the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their decision
to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permis-
sibly restricted by the funding authority.3 4
Taken together, these cases have practically foreclosed the possi-
bility that exclusions from or limitations on government health
programs will be subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny, whether
those programs involve the direct delivery of services or the financ-
ing of services delivered by private providers.35 If health or health
care cannot be fashioned as "fundamental" in any general sense,
and, in any event, if a refusal to fund or even to provide services
related to a "fundamental interest" generally does not "affect" that
interest, then in almost all circumstances the constitutional limits
on the government's discretion in fashioning such programs are
reduced to those provided by the minimal protections of
rationality.
The factual context of Harris raised the question in the most
dramatic fashion: The Court clearly acknowledged that the denial
of abortion funding would place the health of some women in seri-
ous jeopardy and, since many of these women were poor, it also
acknowledged that at least some of them would not find alternative
private sources.3 6 Nonetheless, the Harris Court's answer to the
question was equally clear: The exclusion did not "affect" their
"fundamental interest" in privacy and, consequently, it need only
be rational.3 7 In fact, the Court in Harris made it fairly clear that
34. Id. at 1775. This is perhaps the most controversial extension of the "no worse
off" argument. It assumes that a pregnant woman with limited information-and who is
unaware that some information has been omitted-is "no worse off" than someone with
no information at all, an assumption which has been heavily criticized. It also ignores
altogether the primary thrust of the argument by abortion counselors: They are required
to provide "some but not all" information, something many regard as a form of malprac-
tice. See Wing, supra note 18, at 165-66. See also infra note 79.
35. Cf. "penalty" cases discussed infra text accompanying notes 54-62.
36. 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980).
37. Id. at 323.
1993]
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the constitutional result would have been no different if the ban on
abortion financing reviewed in that case (the so-called Hyde
Amendment) had included a prohibition on life-saving abortions as
well:
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation. Indigency falls into the latter cate-
gory.... [T]he Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman
with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to
obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if
Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.a"
Presumably this means what it stops just short of saying: A
woman who will die unless she gets a life-saving abortion cannot
demand assistance from the government if it rationally chooses not
to provide that service, even if the government is providing health
or health-related benefits of other kinds. She is no worse off than if
there were no government program at all. Therefore neither her
"fundamental interest" in privacy or anything else recognized as
constitutionally "fundamental" is "affected."
The broader implications of this reasoning in Harris and that in
the other cases are just as clear. If the impact of a government
exclusion or limitation on a woman's privacy-at a time when
abortion privacy was still afforded the highest level of constitu-
tional protection-or even on her life does not elevate the constitu-
tional analysis beyond the level of rationality review, then an
individual subject to most any other exclusion or limitation obvi-
ously will be afforded no greater judicial protection. Thus there
may be constitutional constraints that create rights to health care
to those who are denied the benefits of government programs, but
in virtually all circumstances those rights can be reduced to a sin-
gle, minimal principle: The courts must find only that a govern-
ment limit or exclusion is rational.
Even reduced to such terms, the rights created by these constitu-
tional constraints must also be read in light of the other significant
aspect of the abortion financing cases. Some earlier cases had sug-
gested that even under the more limited review of rationality, an
exclusion from or limitation on a government health program
would have to have a legitimate government purpose and that pur-
pose would have to be related, however minimally, to the underly-
ing purposes of the program itself. In other words, rationality
would require some judicial validation of the government's claimed
38. Id. at 316-17.
[Vol. 2
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purpose in excluding or limiting the benefit and some evaluation of
the linkage between that purpose and the broader objectives of the
particular program to which the limit or exclusion is attached. For
example, in 1972 the Supreme Court held that a state could prop-
erly give a lower level of welfare benefits to poor families with de-
pendent children than to comparably-sized families comprised of
poor blind, aged, or disabled welfare recipients.3 9 But in doing so,
the Court noted that the state could rationally make the legislative
judgement that dependent children were more adaptable to the in-
creased hardships of reduced benefits.' In 1982, the Court upheld
as rational the use of different financial eligibility standards for dif-
ferent categories of Medicaid recipients, even where the net result
would be the denial of benefits to some people with higher needs
than those of some people who receive Medicaid's assistance.4'
Again, while decidedly deferential, there was at least some minimal
judicial review of the legislative judgement and a finding that the
use of differing eligibility standards was at least a rational attempt
to measure the relative need of various recipients.42
The abortion financing cases further tested the limits of rational-
ity review because the state or Congress did not justify the exclu-
sion of abortion from various government programs on the basis of
the relative value of various services or on some distinction be-
tween the needs of various recipients, or even as an attempt to allo-
cate scarce program resources more effectively. Rather, in each
case, the exclusion or limit was justified solely as an attempt to
further a political or moral judgement to "encourage childbirth"
or, to be more blunt, to discourage or prevent abortions.43 These
cases raised the question whether such a political or moral judge-
ment is by itself a legitimate justification for a limitation or exclu-
sion from a government program. Again the answer provided was
39. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
40. Id. at 549.
41. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591 (1982). Hogan lost Medicaid eligibility
when he received a Social Security "cost of living" increase. To regain eligibility he had
to "spend down" income and resources far in excess of the "cost of living" increase. As a
result, many people with higher available income were eligible for Medicaid while he was
not.
42. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987); Lyng v. United Auto., Aerospace
& Agric. Workers of Am., 485 U.S. 360 (1988); cf United States Dep't of Agric. v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
43. From a policy point of view, the other significant difference between the abortion
financing limits at issue in these cases and the governmental objectives sought in other
cases lies in the fact that any government health program that funds pregnancy but not
abortion is more expensive than a program which funds both. Nonetheless, it is appar-
ently "rational" even if it is more expensive. See Maher, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80.
19931
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clear and definitive; again the broader implications for those who
are denied the benefits of government health programs are best il-
lustrated by the Harris decision: Even where the decision to ex-
clude abortion financing from federal health care financing
programs would seriously jeopardize the health of many of the pro-
grams' beneficiaries, a legislative decision to "encourage child-
birth" is by itself a sufficiently legitimate basis for doing so.'
To state all this more broadly, there are in form and in theory
constitutional constraints on the government's discretion when it
undertakes to provide or finance health programs, most notably
the requirements of due process and equal protection.4 But in vir-
tually all circumstances, such constraints are quickly reduced to no
more than a requirement that the government be rational. And
under traditional constitutional principles, a finding of rationality
requires little more than the judicial acknowledgement that the
government has advanced some legitimate objective to justify a
limit on or exclusion from a health program-even where that ob-
jective is arguably unrelated to the purposes for which the program
was established or where that same objective would be constitu-
tionally unacceptable if pursued by other means. Indeed, given
both the manner in which the rationality principle is applied and
the underlying constitutional philosophy from which it derives, it
is likely that even a truly irrational limit or exclusion would satisfy
44. 448 U.S. 297, 324. The Court's justification for this position was best articulated
in Bowen:
The District Court was undoubtedly correct in its perception that a number of
needy families have suffered, and will suffer, as a result of the implementation of
[this amendment to the food stamp program]. Such suffering is frequently the
tragic byproduct of a decision to reduce or to modify benefits to a class of needy
recipients. Under our structure of Government, however, it is the function of
Congress-not the courts-to determine whether the savings realized, and pre-
sumably used for other critical government functions, are significant enough to
justify the costs to the individuals affected by such reductions. The [Constitu-
tion] "gives the federal courts no power to impose upon [Congress] their views
of what constitutes wise economic or social policy," by telling it how "to recon-
cile the demands of ... needy citizens with the finite resources available to meet
those demands."
"The discretion belongs to Congress unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment." '..." This standard
of review is premised on Congress' "plenary power to define the scope and the
duration of the entitlement to ... benefits, and to increase, to decrease, or to
terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the relative importance of the
recipients' needs and the resources available to fund the program."
483 U.S. at 596-98 (citations omitted).
45. See supra note 10.
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the constitutional requirement of rationality. 6 In practical terms,
virtually all government decisions in these matters are per se con-
stitutional and the constitutional constraints that exist in theory
and in form are, in fact and in substance, illusory.
As with the "no affirmative right" principle, the few exceptions
to the principle of rationality are so narrow that they primarily
serve as a confirmation of the breadth of the general rule. As noted
earlier, heightened judicial review of a government exclusion or
limitation can be triggered if there is a finding that the result is
discrimination on the basis of a "suspect class." This primarily
arises under circumstances where there is an overtly expressed in-
tent to discriminate on the basis of race or national origin or, at
least where such intent can be inferred from sufficiently persuasive
statistical evidence.48 If such review is triggered, there is virtually
no constitutionally acceptable justification for discrimination based
on a "suspect class."' 49 As noted earlier, however, the applications
of this doctrine have been extremely narrowly drawn. Among
other things, the Supreme Court has rejected any argument that
discrimination based on age, condition of disability, or economic
status would be considered sufficiently "suspect" for constitutional
purposes, even where the intent to discriminate on such bases is
46. A possible example would be a statute that randomly excluded services or benefits
from a program; or a health care program that intentionally covered expensive treatment
options, but excluded coverage of less expensive comparable treatment.
47. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), is the
only case in the last twenty-five years in which the Court has applied the rationality
standard to a government social welfare program and engaged in any realistic examina-
tion of either the government's objectives or the means by which the government claims it
is achieving those objectives. In Moreno, the Court invalidated an exclusion of house-
holds of unrelated persons from the federal food stamp program. Moreno is so aberra-
tional that it cannot be regarded as having any precedential value. Virtually the only
other time the Court has ruled a government action unconstitutional under the rational-
ity standard was in Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(zoning ordinance which excluded home for the disabled was a violation of equal
protection).
48. For a good discussion of the limits of "suspect class" analysis as applied to social
welfare programs, see San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
17-28 (1973), and Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-470.
49. According to the view adopted by the Supreme Court (at least in modem times),
virtually the only acceptable government purpose that can be achieved by a means that
incorporates an overt racial classification is some form of "benign" discrimination or
"affirmative action." Even then some members of the Court would invalidate the classifi-
cation and demand that all government actions be "colorblind." See, e.g., City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Cf Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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clearly expressed.50 The only notable exception is sex or gender
discrimination. In a somewhat inconsistent line of cases, the Court
has attempted to treat government decisions involving sex or gen-
der discrimination as "quasi-suspect," applying something more
than rationality review, but something less than "close scrutiny,"
to such decisions.5 Again, however, such review is only triggered
where there is intentional or overt discrimination.52 Thus there is
virtually an absolute prohibition on any government health pro-
gram that discriminates on the basis of a "suspect class," and some
limitations on discrimination based on sex or gender; but these are
limits which create "rights" to health care in only a very limited
sense.
Another possible but equally narrow exception to the general
rule of rationality in determining the constitutionality of limits on
or exclusions from government health programs arises where the
limit or exclusion imposes a "penalty" on a "fundamental inter-
est." In Shapiro v. Thompson,53 the Supreme Court held that a
state's durational residency requirement imposed as a precondition
to eligibility for welfare benefits effectively "penalized" otherwise
eligible recipients who had recently exercised their constitutionally
protected "right to travel" (more aptly described as a "right to be-
come a state resident.")54 As such, the Court was required to
"closely scrutinize" the legislation. Significantly, the Court re-
jected the state's interests in conserving resources or preventing
fraud-i.e., saving government funds-as sufficiently "compelling"
to justify the impact on the "fundamental interest" or the "right to
travel." 55
50. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-47 (1985); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487
U.S. 450, 458-61 (1988).
51. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (differential treatment of widows
and widowers in determining eligibility for benefits under the Social Security program
unconstitutional); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (differential treatment of fe-
male and male wage earners' income under the Social Security program is constitutional).
52. For example, the Supreme Court had held that a state law that gives preference in
public employment to veterans (who are predominately male) is not sex or gender dis-
crimination despite the obvious impact on females. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979). Note that the various governmental limitations on abortions that
have been considered by the Court have never been characterized as discrimination
against females. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
53. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
54. See also Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). Note that
both this case and Shapiro v. Thompson invalidated durational residency requirements;
the Court has never suggested that the states could not give different social welfare bene-
fits to residents and nonresidents, even if doing so were to impose a "penalty" on
nonresidents.
55. 394 U.S. at 627-31.
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As the cases summarized earlier reflect, the Shapiro "penalty"
analysis has rarely been applied in subsequent decisions of the
Court. Most limits or exclusions do not "affect" "fundamental in-
terests"; they merely withhold funding or services for their exer-
cise; they do not, as in Shapiro, deny financing or access to other
benefits to those who have exercised their "fundamental interests"
without government assistance. And like other exceptions, the
Court has carefully and narrowly drawn the circumstances under
which "penalty" analysis is appropriate. Thus, for example, in
Harris, the Court distinguished the federal limits on abortion fi-
nancing in that case from a Shapiro-type "penalty." In doing so,
however, it acknowledged that:
A substantial constitutional question would arise if Congress had
attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits from an otherwise
eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised
her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her preg-
nancy by abortion. 6
This acknowledgment of Shapiro, even to distinguish it, presum-
ably reaffirms that the general rule of rationality may still be ex-
cepted where government efforts are characterized as "penalties"
on "fundamental interests. '5 7 Nonetheless, it also reaffirms the
narrow definition of the exception and, consequently, how few gov-
ernment actions could be properly characterized as "penalties" for
this purpose.5 8
Using essentially the same reasoning, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that it also will except the general rule of rationality where
a recipient of government financing or services is prohibited from
engaging in a constitutionally-protected activity as a condition on
the receipt of government services or funds for other activities.
Paralleling the decision in Shapiro, the Court has in a few cases
indicated that it is willing to distinguish between circumstances
where a limit on a government program merely fails to subsidize or
support an activity-under such circumstances the denied recipi-
ent is "no worse off" without the program's assistance-and cir-
cumstances where the limit is intended to inhibit or prevent other
nonfunded activities or interests that are constitutionally pro-
56. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S 297, 317 n.19.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
58. From time to time and particularly in recent years there have been proposals, at
both the state and federal levels, that would effectively deny Medicaid or other welfare
benefits to recipients who obtain abortions (with their own funds) or to those who engage
in other unpopular activities. To the extent that these activities are regarded as "funda-
mental," such limits on government benefits are entitled to Shapiro-type protections.
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tected 9 The Rust decision, discussed above, considered whether
this exception would apply to the "gag rule" regulations at issue in
this case. The Rust Court reaffirmed that if a government program
does inhibit or prevent a "fundamental interest" greater judicial
scrutiny is appropriate. 6° Nonetheless, it limited the application of
this exception to those circumstances where the "affected" interest
is clearly distinguishable from the activity receiving government
assistance. Otherwise, Rust argued, such a decision is merely an-
other government choice to fund some things but not others.61
Under this view, the First Amendment interests of family planning
counselors who would counsel or otherwise discuss abortion are
not "penalized" where the government is attempting to fund fam-
ily planning counseling services other than abortion. Again, the
Court's acknowledgment of the possible exception to the rule of
rationality only served to reaffirm the narrowness of its application
and the Court's reluctance to give anything other than cursory re-
view to government discretion as generally exercised in these
matters.62
Perhaps the best way to conclude this extended discussion of
constitutional doctrine is to translate these principles into terms
that more concretely reflect their implications for present and fu-
ture health policy controversies in the United States. Again to be-
gin with the most straightforward, there is absolutely no federal
constitutional requirement that any level of government in the
United States adopt any health care financing or delivery program
or otherwise provide for the health of its citizens. Whatever the
costs--economic or otherwise-of the current mix of private and
59. See, e.g., Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal.,
468 U.S. 364 (1984); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
60. 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
61. Id.
62. There have been several other recent cases in which the Court has considered-
and then rejected-similar arguments and, in doing so, also indicated that it is reluctant
to find a constitutionally significant effect inherent in a social welfare limit or condition.
In Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986), the Court held that a restriction on the defini-
tion of "household" for purposes of determining food stamp eligibility did not "affect"
the "fundamental interest" in choice of family living arrangements. The Court appar-
ently viewed the restriction as a government decision not to subsidize certain kinds of
living arrangements, rather than a prohibition or "penalty" for doing so. Similarly, the
Court in Lyng v. United Automobile Workers of America, 485 U.S. 360 (1988), viewed
the exclusion from the food stamp program of any household in which one member is on
strike as merely a choice not to subsidize striking workers and not an "effect" on the
"fundamental interest" in family integrity or on the First Amendment interests of strik-
ing workers. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (repeal of a statute that
allowed for exclusion of child support payments from determination of a family's income
did not "affect" or penalize the integrity of the family unit).
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public programs available in the United States, however great the
needs of the over 35 million people without insurance, whatever
other failing can be attributed to present health care arrangements,
the impetus for resolving any or all of these problems must come
from something other than the federal Constitution. For that mat-
ter, any of the existing state, local, or federal health financing and
delivery efforts, including Medicare and Medicaid, could be re-
pealed at any time. Whatever else may have led to their establish-
ment and may prevent their repeal, there is no federal
constitutional right to this sort of government assistance or to its
continuation once it has been undertaken. 63
Just as clearly, there is no constitutional right to any level of
benefits or to eligibility for the benefits that are made available by
the government. Income and resource limits for means-tested pro-
grams or categorical or other determinants of eligibility can be de-
fined or limited or reduced rather arbitrarily. Similarly, the scope
of service covered can be limited, conditioned, or "rationed" in any
number of ways, and the results are unlikely to cross constitutional
limits.64 In this regard it should be explicitly noted that these
statements delimit the constitutional rights of both those who are
denied government assistance and those who could be regarded as
the secondary beneficiaries of that assistance: the providers of
health care. As hospitals, physicians, and other providers have al-
ready been informed on numerous occasions, limits on reimburse-
ment, utilization controls, and other cost-containing efforts which
affect the provision of government-financed health care are no dif-
ferent than limits or conditions on program eligibility or service
coverage. With very few exceptions, such restrictions need only be
rational to be constitutional and could be accurately described,
therefore, as constitutional per se.65 For that matter, as noted ear-
lier, even truly irrational limits or exclusions from government
health programs are likely to be regarded as rational in constitu-
tional terms. If government can constitutionally exclude medically
necessary or even life-saving health care or financing from pro-
grams that may well provide the only realistic opportunity for an
individual to receive that care, then certainly the government can
exclude or limit virtually any service or anyone from the health
63. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
64. There are several pending proposals to "ration" health care, most notably the
scheme recently developed by the State of Oregon. For a general description, see Sympo-
sium, The Law & Policy of Health Care Rationing: Models & Accountability, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 1505 (1992).
65. See discussion in WING, supra note 2, at 157-69.
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Annals Health L. 177 1993
Annals of Health Law
programs that it chooses to offer. There are a few limited but note-
worthy constitutional barriers to the government's discretion: The
Constitution does prohibit overt racial discrimination, some forms
of sex or gender discrimination, and, perhaps, programs which im-
pose "penalties" on "fundamental interests." But beyond these
constraints, the federal Constitution, as currently interpreted, has
little influence over the nature and extent of governmental efforts
in matters relating to health and health care in the United States.
There is not, in any realistic sense of the term, a constitutional
right to health care.
SECTION II
The analysis of constitutional doctrine in the previous section is
purposefully focused on what the Supreme Court, particularly as it
is currently composed, views as the scope and meaning of the fed-
eral Constitution in matters relating to health and health care. The
obvious next question is whether there are possible alternative
views. The Supreme Court has clearly refused to recognize any-
thing that could be realistically regarded as a constitutional right
to health care. Could a future Court, perhaps one with an alterna-
tive philosophical or political inclination or one that regards the
specific circumstances of some future health-related controversy as
deserving a new or reconsidered application of constitutional prin-
ciples, do so? Is it even possible to view the nature of the govern-
ment created by the federal Constitution or the requirements of
such principles as equal protection and due process so as to create
constitutionally-mandated obligations beyond those very limited
rights discussed in the section above?
I have staked out my response to these questions in the introduc-
tion to this paper. Simply put, I think the prospects for a recogni-
tion of a general constitutional right to health care are
inconceivable for both theoretical and practical reasons. I can con-
ceive of some future Court refining the principles described in the
previous section in some limited ways and thereby extending the
relevance of constitutional law in some specific health-related con-
troversies. But I can only imagine the creation of anything that
could be realistically regarded as a constitutional right to health
care by constitutional amendment-an extremely unlikely event-
and even then by one that is rather unusually written.66
Any judicial recognition that the state, local, or federal govern-
66. Again, the problem is one of creating an affirmative obligation or "right," rather
than restricting government action of one sort or another. Nothing in the original Con-
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ment has a general, constitutionally-mandated obligation to pro-
tect health or to provide health care would require much more
than an expansive reading of the Constitution's text, the implica-
tions of that text, or the underlying principles that can be inferred
from the structure of the Constitution-the usual interpretative
tools available and not infrequently employed by courts seeking a
more "liberal" reading of the Constitution's requirements. 67 The
recognition of such a right would require a reading of the Constitu-
tion which restructures the general understanding of the Constitu-
tion itself. As noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court
has throughout its history consistently and, literally, without dis-
sent insisted that the governmental powers created by the federal
Constitution are permissive, not mandatory. Only slightly over-
stated, the Constitution has never been read to require any level of
the government-federal, state, or local-to do anything affirma-
tive in the domestic policy area, let alone anything as specific as
establishing a particular social program or extending an existing
financing or delivery program in any significant way. 68 To adopt
such a view of government or, conversely, such a view of health
care, would be to redefine in the most fundamental sense the nature
of the constitutional relationship between the government and its
citizens. Just as importantly, to do so would require the reshaping
of the role of the judicial branch of the government, both with re-
spect to its responsibility for those citizens, but also with respect to
its relative power within the government. It would be impossible
in the present context to even catalogue all of the objections that
could be raised to any attempt to reinterpret the nature of the Con-
stitution in this manner. 69 These are matters that are so fundamen-
tal to American political and judicial thought that it is hard to
imagine even a single judge willing to adopt and then apply such
radically different views, let alone enough justices to comprise a
working majority of the Supreme Court willing to do so. Or to put
the matter in even more pragmatic terms, it is even harder to imag-
ine that someone with the inclination to restructure constitutional
doctrine in such a radical way could survive the various formal and
stitution or any of its subsequent amendments is written in this manner. See infra note
81.
67. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-71 (2d ed.
1991).
68. The only exceptions are discussed infra notes 82-85.
69. For general references, see STONE ET AL., supra note 67, at 759-1009. For a more
textual explanation, see WING, supra note 2, at 17-39.
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informal screens necessary to judicial appointment.7 °
What is imaginable-although still unlikely and certainly at
odds with the philosophy of the current Supreme Court-is that
some future Court may give a more expansive reading to the con-
stitutional constraints on the government's discretion once the gov-
ernment undertakes to provide a health or health-related program.
For example, there are a number of ways in which the Court could
give more substantive meaning to the rationality standard in equal
protection and substantive due process cases. The Court could re-
quire the government to more specifically or concretely define the
purposes it claims are achieved by a limit on or exclusion from a
health program, and then invalidate as "irrational" those that are
only vaguely or inadequately defined.71 Or the Court could require
that the government's justification for a program limit or exclusion
be more closely aligned with the overall purposes of the program,
reversing the apparent dictates of the abortion funding cases.72
The Court could also give more meaning to the rationality stan-
dard if it required that there be some minimal evidentiary or other
basis for concluding that a limit or exclusion will actually achieve
its claimed purpose, rather than deferring entirely to the govern-
ment's judgement in these matters as the decisions of the Court
almost always have in the past.7 3 Any future modification of the
rationality standard that gives the courts some meaningful role in
reviewing or evaluating the underlying justification for a program
limit or exclusion at least would provide some few, affected indi-
viduals with what current constitutional doctrine apparently denies
70. For a good, if somewhat biased account of the appointment process, see ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTATION OF AMERICA (1989).
71. There are only two relevant precedents that arguably do so. In United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Supreme Court rejected
the government's argument that the restriction of food stamps to households of related
people was a rational attempt to eliminate fraud or to limit benefits to those who were
"involuntarily" poor. Rather, in the Court's view, the statute was intended to prevent
"hippies" from participating in the program, a purpose that furthered no "legitimate
government interest." Id. at 535-38. A similar analysis was applied in Cleburne, Tex. v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In that case the Court held that a munici-
pal decision to deny a zoning exception to a group home for the mentally retarded was a
violation of equal protection. While claiming that it was applying a rationality standard,
the Court rejected the government's argument that the zoning restriction was a "ra-
tional" attempt to protect the safety of the home's residents and concluded that the re-
striction was based instead on an "irrational prejudice" against the retarded. Id. at 450.
Both of these cases are considered aberrational and have little precedential value. The
weight of the case law holding to the contrary is overwhelming.
72. See supra notes 43-44. See also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
73. The Moreno and Cleburne decisions can be read as imposing such a requirement.
As noted, however, these cases have little precedential value.
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them: the opportunity to successfully argue that the government's
denial of benefits to them is irrational and therefore beyond the
limits of rationality.
A future Court also could provide additional constitutional pro-
tection to at least some individuals that are denied the benefits of
government health programs if it chose to interpret its obligation
to protect "suspect" classifications from discrimination more ex-
pansively. The Court could choose to expand the notion of a "sus-
pect" classification, primarily limited under current doctrine to
racial and ethnic minorities, to include discrimination based on
age, disability, gender, or some other characteristic that the Court
views as deserving the same sort of judicial scrutiny currently ex-
tended to overt discrimination based on race or ethnicity. 74 Alter-
natively, the Court could allow "close" or at least more heightened
judicial scrutiny to be triggered where a government program has a
disproportionate impact on a "suspect" class, rather than limiting
the application of the doctrine to those cases where the Court finds
intentional or "de jure" discrimination.75 In fact, to do so would
give constitutional status to some legislatively imposed require-
ments that already exist. Many existing federal and state statutory
prohibitions on race, sex, and other forms of discrimination pro-
hibit some kinds of "de facto" or disproportionate impact
discrimination.76
Another possibility-again unlikely but at least conceivable-is
that some future Court could expand those circumstances under
which it will more closely examine limits or exclusions from gov-
ernment health programs that involve but do not, under current
constitutional interpretation, "affect" important or "fundamental"
interests. Unlike the doctrinal views demonstrated in the abortion
financing decisions, a future Court might make a more realistic as-
sessment of the actual impact of the government decision rather
than rely so rigidly on "no worse off" analysis.77 For example, the
Court might reconsider whether an individual excluded from or
denied the benefits of a government program is "no worse off"
where the government is the primary provider of services in a geo-
74. See supra notes 48-52. See a discussion and rejection of these possibilities in
Cleburne, 973 U.S. at 440-42.
75. Virtually the only argument for doing so was voiced by Justice Marshall, dissent-
ing in the abortion financing cases. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454 (1977).
76. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp.
1992); 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1992) (as interpreted by Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv., 463 U.S
582 (1983)).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
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graphic area and alternative private arrangements are not, in any
realistic sense, available.78 It is also possible-some might even ar-
gue likely-that the Court will be asked to directly reconsider the
logic underlying its decision in Rust. The current Court's charac-
terization of the "gag rules" reviewed in that case as merely a deci-
sion to fund some services but not others has been heavily
criticized by both legal and medical experts. 9 Some future Court
could question whether the Rust Court accurately understood the
realities of family planning counseling or whether it was correct in
concluding that women receiving the services subject to the "gag"
limits were as a factual matter "no worse off."
Note, however, that none of these changes would have any sig-
nificant effect on the analysis of most governmental decisions to
deny services, condition eligibility, or otherwise limit the scope or
coverage of government health service or financing programs. As
described in the previous section, most government limits or exclu-
sions do not involve-let alone "affect" in the constitutional
sense-something considered "fundamental." Only if a future
Court were to go one, dramatic step further, recognizing as "fun-
damental" an individual's life or health or some other interest re-
lated to the individual's health or medical needs, would the scope
of judicial review of most government decisions regarding limits on
or exclusions from health programs be radically changed. That is
to say, if both the "no worse of" analysis demonstrated in the
abortion financing decisions were abandoned and the Constitution
were read as defining "life" or "health" as "fundamental," then
existing government programs which exclude important and, ar-
guably, all life-saving benefits would be subject to more rigorous
judicial examination; and presumably, only those for which the
government could present a sufficiently persuasive "compelling in-
terest" would be upheld. 80 There still would be no constitutional
78. As the Supreme Court has demonstrated many times, if the services provided by
the government are viewed as only one alternative available to consumers, then any re-
fusal to provide abortion or any other service leaves the consumer "no worse off." See,
e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 508-510 (1989). What has not
been addressed is whether the logic of these cases would apply if the government were the
only provider of health care under some sort of socialized scheme. Surprisingly, even
Justice Rehnquist has admitted that a "different analysis might apply." Id. at 510 n.8.
79. See WING, supra note 2, at 174. Note, however, that during the presidential cam-
paign of 1992, Bill Clinton promised to repeal these regulations if he were elected. As a
consequence, judicial reconsideration of these particular regulations may have been
mooted by his subsequent victory.
80. Among other questions that would have to be answered is what was suggested but
not completely answered in earlier decisions: Whether the government can claim an in-
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basis for a claim that the government has an affirmative obligation
to provide health or health-related programs in the first place.81
Nonetheless, once the government undertook to provide any health
service or financing program, as both the states and the federal
government in the United States traditionally have, there would be
substantial, judicially enforceable constraints on .the government's
discretion to limit eligibility or service coverage, to impose cost-
containment measures, or to make any resource-limiting decision.
The specific implications of "closely scrutinizing" these decisions
are almost impossible to anticipate; to do so would be unprece-
dented, in both the popular and the technical sense of the term.
The more general implications are, however, abundantly clear.
The courts would be required to do exactly what the traditional
interpretation of the constitutional constraints on government dis-
cretion and of the judicial role in their application has prevented:
specifically define those purposes that the government can legiti-
mately pursue in such matters and, more importantly, evaluate the
wisdom and effectiveness of pursuing those purposes through
means which "affect" the life or health or other "fundamental in-
terest" of some individual. In essence, under such doctrinal revi-
sions there would be a constitutional right to health care.
But to state the potential implications of such doctrinal changes
in these terms only confirms how unlikely it is that they will be
adopted and applied. Such substantive constraints on government
discretion and such an enhanced and powerful judicial role are ex-
actly what the Court and most constitutional authorities in the
United States have been seeking to avoid. As the discussion earlier
demonstrates, the Court repeatedly has resisted attempts to take
even relatively modest steps towards the recognition of a right to
health care. It has done so because of the particular way in which
it has defined "fundamental interests," the rigidity with which it
has adhered to "no worse oft" analysis, and its specific applications
of other important constitutional principles that, taken together,
almost always result in a complete deference to government discre-
terest in saving resources or reducing costs as a sufficiently "compelling" justification for
denying or adversely "affecting" a fundamental interest.
81. Again it must be emphasized that the recognition of health or health care as a
"fundamental interest" or even as an explicitly enumerated constitutional right would
still not obligate the government to provide health care benefits. As discussed in supra
text accompanying notes 3-5, there are no affirmative obligations imposed on the govern-
ment; constitutional rights primarily serve as limitations on discretionary actions. That is
the primary reason that an amendment to the federal Constitution that is intended to
obligate the government to provide health care of one form or another would have to be
rather "peculiarly" written.
1993]
HeinOnline  -- 2 Annals Health L. 183 1993
Annals of Health Law
tion in determining the scope and nature of its health benefits pro-
grams. But that deference is not merely the net result of these
specific applications of principle or, for that matter, of the Court's
specific views concerning the importance of health or health care.
Rather, the converse is true: The Court has interpreted and ap-
plied constitutional principles narrowly in health-related cases pri-
marily because of its long-standing insistence that the judicial role
be deferential in most if not all matters and, therefore, in these
particular cases as well. To create a constitutional right to health
care, the Court would have to abandon the traditional view of the
Constitution and its division of authority among the branches of
government in some very fundamental ways. Whatever the merits
or appeal of doing so might be, the prospects for doing so are, liter-
ally, inconceivable.
Even if some future Supreme Court was willing to do just that,
break with these constitutional traditions in an inconceivable man-
ner, that Court would still find considerable difficulty in attempting
to define and enforce a constitutional right to health care. In most
of the circumstances under which the Court recognizes an individ-
ual right and consequently allows for its protection by judicial
"close scrutiny" or some other heightened form of judicial review,
the basic judicial decision is whether to invalidate or, in some
cases, enjoin some specific governmental action. To make such a
decision, the reviewing court may be required to weigh the social
or economic impact of various alternatives available to the govern-
ment, to evaluate competing public and individual interests, and to
make other difficult, value-laden determinations-assessments for
which judges and the judicial process are not particularly well-
suited or prepared. But at least in most of these cases, a court need
only address these issues to the extent necessary to decide whether
a particular government action, an action which the legislative or
executive branch has chosen to undertake, exceeds constitutional
limits. In contrast, the recognition and enforcement of an affirma-
tive government obligation to finance or provide health-related
benefits would require the courts to examine similarly difficult
questions in a much more abstract and protracted fashion. In ad-
dition to some general statement of the government's affirmative
obligation, the courts would be required to adopt judicially-
measurable standards to determine whether the government has
met that obligation; where the government fails or refuses to com-
ply, the courts would be required to devise and oversee a judicially-
prescribed remedy. In doing so, the courts might be required to
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prescribe changes in statutes and regulations, rather than simply
invalidate those that are enacted, or restructure the manner pro-
grams are managed and delivered, rather than prohibit specific ac-
tions. Perhaps most critically, where the remedial measures
ordered by the courts require additional resources-as the judicial
recognition of a constitutional right to health care most certainly
would-the courts must be prepared to order the reallocation of
governmental resources from existing programs to health-related
programs or to order the creation of new revenue sources. In
short, the recognition of a right to health care would require the
courts, within the confines of judicial proceedings, to tell the other
branches of the government how to govern, rather than tell them
what actions are beyond their reach. As discussed earlier, most
courts are reluctant to do anything that even suggests that they are
usurping the roles of their coordinate branches; just as impor-
tantly, courts are not structured or prepared to make the sorts of
decisions that are required when they do so. Indeed, implicit in
any argument that the courts should recognize and enforce a con-
stitutional right to health care is the assumption that the judicial
branch of the government could devise a distribution of govern-
ment health benefits that is more equitable or comprehensive or,
simply, better than that which had been previously provided by the
legislative and executive branches. If who-should-get-what and
how-it-will-be-paid-for decisions are made by judges and through
judicial process, that assumption is at best unproven. The result
may well be no better and could well be worse than that which
exists now.
Moreover, whatever the extent of the courts' willingness and
ability to define the government's obligation to provide health care,
they still may be unable to mandate compliance with their pro-
nouncements where the legislative or executive branches refuse or
claim they are unable to comply. The enforcement options avail-
able to the courts, such as monetary penalties or imprisonment of
government officials, the judicial takeover of government pro-
grams, and the like, are at their best crudely fashioned and are
particularly inappropriate when used to coerce those officials to af-
firmatively govern. The few circumstances under which the courts
have recognized an affirmative government obligation to provide
health or related benefits have demonstrated these difficulties far
too well. After two decades of attempting to enforce the much-
publicized "right to treatment" for mental patients recognized in
Wyatt v. Aderholdt, the federal courts officially terminated efforts
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to do so, openly admitting their inability to enforce such an obliga-
tion absent legislative cooperation. 2 The other occasions on which
there have been judicial efforts to enforce even modestly defined
rights to health care for the mentally retarded, prisoners, and other
confined individuals have fared little better.8 3 The only circum-
stance in which the American judicial system has attempted to en-
force an obligation on the government that could be regarded as
comparable to that which would be required if a general constitu-
tional right to health care were recognized involves the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, order-
ing the racial desegregation of public schools with "all deliberate
speed."'8 4 Americans learned many lessons, both good and bad,
about themselves and their government following the decision in
Brown. Among those lessons was the clear demonstration of the
inability of the judicial system to enforce any substantial affirma-
tive government obligation so long as the other branches of govern-
ment are unwilling or unable to comply. 5 A judicial recognition
of a broadly-defined, constitutional right to health care, itself an
inconceivable event, might well demonstrate that same lesson once
again.
SECTION III
My primary objective in this paper is to demonstrate that the
government in the United States has no constitutional obligation to
provide health care. The federal Constitution established a govern-
ment in which decisions regarding the distribution of benefits and
services are almost exclusively discretionary. The judicial role
within that government allows for the recognition and protection
82. Wyatt v. Aderholdt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See Edward H. Stevens,
Wyatt v. Stickney Concludes with a Whimper, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 139 (1987).
83. See cases cited supra note 6. See also WING, supra note 2, at 58-72.
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (original declaration that separate but equal schools are in-
herently unequal); 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (enforcement order including the "all deliberate
speed" language). Note that even in this case, the Court was not imposing an affirmative
obligation on the government, rather it ordered local governments that choose to provide
public schools to do so within the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. In the-
ory, local governments are not required to provide public education. Cf. Griffin v.
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (local government not required to provide public
education but could not close schools with the intent of avoiding a desegregation order).
85. In the opinion of most authorities, to the extent that American public schools
were integrated following Brown-a dubious proposition-that success was a result of
efforts taken by the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, not the
judiciary, efforts that were fueled by political considerations and not judicially-ordered,
constitutional considerations. See STONE, ET AL., supra note 67, at 524-33.
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of individual rights, but that role has always been defined rather
narrowly-and deliberately so; moreover, with few exceptions,
such judicial power has been used only to limit or prohibit legisla-
tive or executive discretion, not to create affirmative governmental
responsibilities. No court or, for that matter, any serious constitu-
tional authority has ever persuasively argued that these principles
should be or could be excepted in such a way as to require any
level of government to provide health care or otherwise protect the
health of its citizens.
This does not mean, however, that the term "right" has no rele-
vance in describing health policy in the United States. As a consti-
tutional matter, the government may have no obligation to provide
for the health needs of its citizens, but in terms that reflect political
realities, both the state and federal governments have very little
choice but to act in such matters, and to act in accordance with
what is perceived as the "right" of Americans to adequate health
care-and what is, consequently, the responsibility of their govern-
ment to provide for it. The meaning and limits of that "right," as
with all political phenomena, are somewhat amorphous and, obvi-
ously, less immutable than a right that is based on constitutional
principles or enforced by judicial decree. Nonetheless, it would be
a mistake to describe current health policy in the United States or
its likely future directions without an acknowledgement of the fun-
damental importance of health and health care in American poli-
tics and of the demands and expectations that Americans place on
their government to provide for them. Perhaps most important in
the present context, it would be equally inaccurate to assume that
the lack of a constitutional right to health care in the United States
is the primary difference between the health care available in this
country and that available in others.
There is no doubt that for many Americans, health care delivery
and financing are primarily private-sector transactions. They
purchase services from physicians and other private providers with
financing by some form of private insurance, insurance that they
receive as an employment benefit.8 6 The role played by the state
and federal governments is supplemental to these arrangements.
Nonetheless, the role of the government is extensive and signifi-
cant. At least since the enactment of the Medicare program in
1965, the federal government has provided financing for the pri-
86. For a basic description, see GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH
LAW 121-64 (1990). For a more detailed description, see EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (2d ed. 1992).
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mary health care needs of virtually everyone 65 years of age or
older and, after 1972, many disabled people as well. s7 At the same
time it established Medicare, the federal government also created
the Medicaid program, providing federal funding for state pro-
grams of health benefits for some-though clearly not all-the na-
tion's poor.88 There are a variety of other state and federal efforts
that finance and in some cases provide health services for other
targeted populations.89 In addition, a few states and many local
governments maintain public hospitals, clinics, or other service de-
livery programs. 90
The government also plays a less visible but equally important
role in maintaining and, to a certain extent, regulating privately-
purchased health insurance. Both the state and federal gov-
ernment have provided tax incentives for the purchase of
employment-based health insurance.9 1 Since 1986, employers have
been required to provide continuing coverage to former employees
for up to eighteen months. 92 Some state laws prohibit certain in-
surance practices, mandate coverage of certain services, and regu-
late the structure of health maintenance organizations and other
alternative arrangements. 9 A variety of state and federal laws also
provide some limits on the circumstances under which treatment
can be denied, even to those without the ability to pay.94
87. For a basic description, see ANNAS ET AL., supra note 86, at 29-32, 187-98. For a
more detailed description, see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION,
MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1992).
88. For a basic description of Medicaid and the contours of Medicaid eligibility, see
ANNAS ET AL., supra note 86, at 29-32, 165-87. There is no single reference that ade-
quately describes the details of the various states' Medicaid programs. The most useful
resource is HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REVIEW (published four times a year and including articles summarizing various aspects
of these programs).
89. For a basic overview, see ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 86, at 25-29, 159-64. For a
description of recent state efforts, see U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCESS
TO HEALTH CARE: STATES RESPOND TO GROWING CRISIS (1992). In addition to Medi-
caid and Medicare, there are a number of other health care programs that represent sub-
stantial fiscal commitments. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 701 (1991) (federal block grant
funding to states for maternal and child health programs).
90. For a basic description, see ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 86, at 22-25, 64-71. See
also NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, MANUAL OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INDIGENTS (National Clearinghouse for Legal Services
1985).
91. See ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 86, at 138.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (Supp. 1992).
93. For a general description, see ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 86, at 142-50.
94. There are a variety of state common law and legislative requirements concerning
obligations to provide emergency care. For an overview, see ANNAS, ET AL., supra note
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Obviously the aggregated result of these various governmental
efforts is something less than a comprehensive national program or
even a coordinated national policy. There are many shortcomings
and inequities inherent in such a mix of private and public, and
state and federal arrangements.95 Perhaps most critically, as many
as 35 million Americans, roughly 15% of the population, were un-
able to purchase private third party coverage in 1992, yet they were
also ineligible for the various government financing programs. 96
Notwithstanding, the magnitude of these government efforts
should not be understated. In 1992 over 45% of the more than
$800 billion spent on health services in the United States were paid
directly by the state or federal governments. 9 In addition, a signif-
icant portion of the services that were privately financed were pub-
licly subsidized by the tax treatment of employment-purchased
health insurance-at an estimated cost of over $60 billion in gov-
ernment revenues. 9s Medicare alone cost nearly $140 billion in
1992,99 representing the second largest-and fastest growing-item
in the federal domestic budget.l°° The costs of the state Medicaid
programs were comparable; indeed, in their efforts to maintain
their Medicaid programs many states have been driven to the brink
of bankruptcy.' 0 ' Whatever these programs have failed to do
should not overshadow what they do provide or the level of fiscal
commitment that they represent.
Nor should their shortcomings overshadow the depth of the
political commitment that underlies these efforts. Programs such
as Medicare and Medicaid may be extraordinarily expensive, but
86, at 43-90. The most substantial obligation derives from the federal law adopted in
1986 which requires most hospitals to examine and treat all emergency patients and
women in labor. 42 U.S.C. § 1395DD (Supp. 1992).
95. Obviously there are many shortcomings inherent in this peculiarly American sys-
tem of health care-of which the number of people who do not have third party coverage
is only the most prominent and, perhaps, critical. For a full discussion, see Kenneth R.
Wing, American Health Policy In The United States, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 608
(1986). For a more recent critique (and one with a slightly different tone), see CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
HEALTH CARE COSTS (1992) [hereinafter ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS].
96. For a good, recent analysis of the number of people who are uninsured and their
characteristics, see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SOURCES OF HEALTH
INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH
1991 CURRENT POPULATION STUDY (Issue Brief No. 123, February 1992).
97. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, PROJECTIONS OF NATIONAL
HEALTH EXPENDITURES 38 (1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES].
98. Id. at 56. See also ANNAS, ET AL., supra note 86, at 139.
99. See NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES, supra note 97, at 44.
100. See ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, supra note 95, at 49-52.
101. Id. at 54.
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they are extraordinarily popular as well. Despite two presidential
administrations expressly committed to reducing federal health
spending, federal support for Medicare, Medicaid, and most other
health programs survived the Reagan-Bush years remarkably in-
tact.0 2 Federal health spending not only continued to grow during
these years, but there also was a surprising level of support for
expanding the scope of federal health programs-and, conse-
quently, the share of the federal budget committed to health
care. 103
The 1992 election year politics reaffirmed the strength of these
political sentiments. Even at a time when the reduction of the fed-
eral deficit was a central concern of the election debates, no candi-
date "dared" suggest a reduction in government health programs
as a solution. The costs of such programs must be "contained,"
many argued, but no one argued that the level of benefits should be
"reduced"-a rhetorical distinction that carried an important
message."° The campaign of 1992 also confirmed that many if not
most Americans wanted the government to both contain health
care costs and to provide some sort of public solution for the
problems faced by the nation's uninsured. Indeed, the repeated
pairing in campaign debates of the problems facing those who are
uninsured with the problem of containing health care costs-when
the latter represented the most convenient excuse for ignoring the
former-was the best single indicator of the political status of
health care. Even when the economy in the United States was suf-
102. For an overview and analysis of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures during the
1980s, see PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, MEDICARE AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO CONGRESS 17-19 (1992), and Katha-
rine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1990, 13 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 29, 39-42 (Fall 1991).
103. See, e.g., UNITED STATES BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH
CARE, A CALL FOR ACTION, FINAL REPORT, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1990). Of equal
importance in documenting the prevailing politics of health care in the United States was
the fate of various proposals to promote market-based systems of health care financing
and delivery in the United States. Even the most ardent advocates of such "conservative"
approaches have had to restructure their proposals to account for the political support for
some government effort that will ensure universal access. For a good analysis, see STU-
ART M. BUTLER & EDMUND F. HAISLMAIER, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
AMERICA (rev. ed. 1989).
104. Documenting campaign rhetoric and translating it into specific policy positions
are particularly difficult tasks. For creditable efforts to do so, see PRESIDENT BUSH
PRESENTS HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSAL, SOCIAL INSURANCE UPDATE No. 22 1-4
(National Academy of Social Insurance, March 1992); Noninvasive Surgery: George Bush
& Health Reform, MED. & HEALTH, Oct. 12, 1992; Covering the Bases: Clinton & Health
Reform, MED. & HEALTH, Oct. 5, 1992; President Clinton: What Will It Mean?, MED. &
HEALTH, Nov. 9, 1992.
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fering and the economics of health care were even worse, many
Americans were nonetheless demanding that their government
spend more resources to make health care more widely and ade-
quately available.105
The political demands of 1992 were not aberrational nor will
they be short lived. Some Americans may prefer the initiative to
come from their state government rather than the federal govern-
ment and many have a strong bias against "big government" pro-
grams and in favor of strategies that give a significant role to
private institutions.106 But in some way or form, "something must
be done" and done rather quickly to reform health care or, at least,
something must be done to give the appearance that the govern-
ment is responding to these demands. The simple political reality
is that many if not most people in the United States believe that an
adequate level of health care should be available to everyone and
that it is the responsibility of the government to take whatever
steps are necessary to make it available. More importantly, many
if not most people are considering those beliefs as significant fac-
tors in their voting behavior. It is in this regard that health care
can be accurately described as a political entitlement or "right" in
the United States. Government efforts to insure the adequacy or
availability of health care may be constitutionally discretionary,
but as a political matter such efforts are something that Americans
demand and expect.
CONCLUSION
While the political support for a right to health care in the
United States should not be overlooked, it should not be overstated
either. There are obviously differences between a right to health
care that is secured by the United States Constitution and one that
is based only on the political will of the electorate, not the least of
which is the increased ability of governmental institutions to resist
or deflect even the strongest-held political belief. Students of his-
tory would be quick to point out that on several occasions in the
past prevailing politics in the United States had apparently dictated
105. For a good summary of public opinion in the United States concerning health
care and its reform, see EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PUBLIC OPINION
ON HEALTH, RETIREMENT, AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (Issue Brief No. 132,
December 1992).
106. Given the peculiar contours of these political sentiments, it was no political sur-
prise to hear the eventual winner in the 1992 presidential campaign promising that he
would immediately undertake dramatic health care reforms, but based on something
called "managed competition." See discussion in sources cited supra note 104.
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that the government soon would undertake major health care re-
forms; yet what followed was something far less than what was
initially predicted. 107 For that matter, whatever the dictates of cur-
rent politics for health care reform, there are a number of compet-
ing demands on the nation's governmental institutions. Even
purely as a matter of good policy and stripped of politics alto-
gether, there are some sound reasons why the American govern-
ment may not attempt simultaneously to expand access and
control costs and do all of the other things that would be necessary
to secure access to health care for all its citizens.
Thus while it appears in the early 1990s that the United States is
poised on the brink of some major health care reform, even the
short-term future is difficult to predict with any specificity. The
state or federal political leadership may be willing to expend the
resources that will be necessary to provide for the needs of the na-
tion's uninsured; they may be willing to spend the "political capi-
tal" that will be the necessary price of containing health care costs;
they even may be willing to do both. On the other hand, they may
respond to the call that "something must be done" as politicians
more often do, with patchwork programs and temporary answers,
more rhetorical handwringing and less that results in real change
or reform. What they cannot do is ignore altogether the current
political status of health care. The government must respond-one
way or another-to the strong and undeniable demand that ade-
quate health care be available for everyone in the United States.
That is the nature of the right to health care in the United States,
no more and no less.
Observers from other jurisdictions may find this to be a peculiar
and peculiarly American scenario. Certainly the manner in which
health care is financed and delivered in the United States is some-
what unique, as are the social and historical origins of that scheme.
It should hardly be surprising that the legal and political status of
such a scheme is equally unique. There is also the undeniable fact
that health care expenditures in the United States have been in-
creasing at extraordinary rates and that these expenditures have
reached unparalleled levels. It should again come as no surprise
that a country that is spending in excess of fourteen percent of its
gross domestic product on health care-nearly twice what most
other industrialized countries manage to spend on theirs-is facing
unique and peculiar circumstances.
107. See, for example, a description of President Carter's proposals for health care
reform in WING, supra note 2, at 154.
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These same observers, however, should hesitate before conclud-
ing that the differences between the circumstances facing the
United States and those facing other countries derive from the fact
that the right to health care in the Untied States is no more and no
less than what has been described above as a political and not a
constitution right-and that this too is unique and peculiar to the
United States. Are the demands and expectations for health care
that are imposed on the governments of other jurisdictions based
not only on political foundations but on constitutional mandates as
well? In particular, when the legislative and executive branches of
their governments fail to provide adequate health services, can the
citizens of other jurisdictions seek-and receive-a judicial man-
date that they be provided, a mandate that these other branches
have no choice but to obey? Or is it the case that in other coun-
tries, as in the United States, that the government ultimately must
respond to the demands of its electorate, no more and no less?
These questions outline a framework for what could be a rather
interesting comparison among jurisdictions, albeit one that is
somewhat more complicated than that which usually takes place in
health policy debates. I ask these questions in this manner not be-
cause I claim to have the answer to each but rather to invite some
response from my counterparts in other jurisdictions. My
"hunch"-and it is little more than just that, a "hunch"-is that
the answers to these questions will indicate that the nature of the
rights to health care that exist in other countries is ultimately little
different than that which exists in the United States: They are
political and not constitutional rights. In fact, I have a hunch that
in most other countries the distinction I have drawn in this article
between a constitutional right and a political right is blurry at best
if not wholly inapplicable. That is to say, what may be most
unique in the United States is not the nature of the right to health
care, but the particular and peculiar meaning we give to the con-
cept of a constitutional right as we claim it exists in the United
States-notwithstanding the gap between that concept in theory
and that concept in practice.'08 Thus I am really raising two re-
lated sets of questions: Are there constitutional rights in other ju-
risdictions and, if so, is a right to health care among them? I have
my hunches about the answers to both lines of inquiry, but, as
noted above, I look forward to the responses from my counterparts
in other jurisdictions.
108. See discussion supra notes 84-85.
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